Robust Stable Marriage is a variant of the classical Stable Marriage problem, where the robustness of a given stable matching is measured by the number of modifications required for repairing it in case an unforeseen event occurs. An (a, b)-supermatch is defined as a stable matching in which if any a (non-fixed) men/women break up, it is possible to find another stable matching by changing the partners of those a men/women and also the partners of at most b other couples. In this paper, we focus on the complexity of finding an (a, b)-supermatch.
Introduction
Matching under preferences is a multidisciplinary family of problems, mostly studied by the researchers in the field of economics and computer science. There are many variants of the matching problems such as College Admission, Hospital/Residents, Stable Marriage, Stable Roommates, etc. The reader is referred to the book written by Manlove for a comprehensive background on the subject [1] .
Current studies in the literature indicate that different robustness notions for different matching problems are being studied. To the best of our knowledge, the very first robustness notion in matching problems is studied on the Geometric Stable Roommates problem [2] . Later on, there appear a few research papers on robustly stable mechanisms in matching markets [3, 4, 5] . The most recent notions are proposed in Stable Marriage problem, where one of them uses a probability model and a social cost function to measure robustness [6] , and the other one uses a cost function to calculate repair costs of each stable matching and use it as a measure of robustness [7, 8, 9] .
We work on the robustness notion proposed by Genc et. al. [8] . In the context of Stable Marriage problem, given a Stable Marriage instance I, a stable matching M is defined as a mapping between men and women such that each men/women are matched with at most one person from the opposite sex and there is no man-woman pair that prefer each other to their situations in M . The authors introduced the notion of (a, b)-supermatches as a measure to indicate the robustness of a stable matching and refer to finding an (a, b)-supermatch as the Robust Stable Marriage (RSM) problem. They also propose a polynomialtime procedure for measuring the (1, b)-robustness of a given problem. However, they leave the complexity of the Robust Stable Marriage problem as an open problem [8] .
Definition 1 (π 1 ) Given: A Stable Marriage instance I. Problem: Is there a stable matching M in I such that if any a pairs want to break their match in M , it is guaranteed to have another stable matching in I by changing the partners of these a pairs and also the partners of at most b other pairs in M ?
This notion is inspired by the work of Ginsberg et al. on (a, b)-supermodels in Boolean Satisfiability [10] , and (a, b)-super solutions in CSP by Hebrard et.al. [11, 12, 13] . Both finding an (a, b)-supermodel and an (a, b)-super solution are shown to be N P-complete. However, the complexity of the Robust Stable Marriage problem is left as an open problem by the authors of [8] .
The focus of this paper is to study the complexity of finding an (a, b)supermatch according to parameters a and b. In order to show that the general case of RSM, which is the decision of existence of an (a, b)-supermatch, is N Pcomplete, it is sufficient to show that a restricted version of the general problem is N P-complete. Thus, we first show that the decision problem for finding a (1, 1)-supermatch on a restricted family of instances is N P-complete, then we generalize this complexity result to the general case. Figure 1 illustrates the hierarchy between different cases of RSM. In Section 2, the notations and the basics of the Stable Marriage problem are introduced, then we refer to some theorems that are already present in the literature. In Section 3, we describe a restricted family of Stable Marriage instances.
In Section 4, after defining a specific SAT formulation based on the properties of the restricted family, we show by reduction that decision version of finding an (1, 1)-supermatch is N P-complete.
Notations & Background
We give in this section the different notations used throughout the paper as well as some background information about the Stable Marriage problem and Schaefer's dichotomy theorem for satisfiability.
Stable Marriage
The Stable Marriage problem takes as input a set of men U = {m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n1 } and a set of women W = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n2 } where each person has an ordinal preference list over people of the opposite sex. For the sake of simplicity we suppose in the rest of the paper that n 1 = n 2 .
A matching M is a one-to-one correspondence between U and W . For each man m i , M (m i ) = w j is called the partner of m i , and it is denoted by M (w j ) = m i in the other way around. M can be considered as a set of pairs. In that case,
A matching M is called stable if there exists no blocking pair for M . A pair m i , w j is said to be stable if it appears in a stable matching. A pair m i , w j is called fixed if m i , w j appears in every stable matching. In this case, the man m i and woman w j are called fixed. The man-optimal matching is denoted by M 0 and the woman-optimal (man-pessimal) matching is denoted by M z . In the rest of the paper we use n to denote the number of non-fixed men and I be an instance of a Stable Marriage problem. We measure the distance between two stable matchings M i , M j by the number of men that have different partners in M i and M j , denoted by d(M i , M j ). A stable matching M is called an (a,b)-supermatch if any a agents decide to break their matches in M , thereby breaking a pairs, it is possible to "repair" M (i.e., find another stable matching) by changing the assignments of those a agents and the assignments of at most b others. Formally, a stable matching M is said to be (a, b)-supermatch if for any set Ψ ⊂ M of a stable pairs that are not fixed, there exists a stable matching M such that M ∩ Ψ = ∅ and
The structure that represents all stable matchings forms a lattice M . In this lattice, the man-optimal matching is denoted by M 0 and the woman-optimal (man-pessimal) matching is denoted by M z .
Let M be a stable matching. A rotation ρ = ( m k0 , w k0 , m k1 , w k1 , . . . , m k l−1 , w k l−1 ) (where l ∈ N * ) is an ordered list of pairs in M such that changing the partner of each man m ki to the partner of the next man m ki+1 (the operation +1 is modulo l) in the list ρ leads to a stable matching denoted by M/ρ. The latter is said to be obtained after eliminating ρ from M . In this case, we say that m li , w li is eliminated by ρ, whereas m li , w li+1 is produced by ρ, and that ρ is exposed on M . If a pair m i , w j appears in a rotation ρ, we denote it by m i , w j ∈ ρ. Additionally, if a man m i appears at least in one of the pairs in the rotation ρ, we say m i is involved in ρ. There exists a partial order for rotations. A rotation ρ is said to precede another rotation ρ (denoted by ρ ≺≺ ρ), if ρ is eliminated in every sequence of eliminations that starts at M 0 and ends at a stable matching in which ρ is exposed [14] . Note that this relation is transitive, that is, ρ ≺≺ ρ ∧ ρ ≺≺ ρ =⇒ ρ ≺≺ ρ. Two rotations are said to be incomparable if one does not precede the other.
The structure that represents all rotations and their partial order is a directed graph called rotation poset denoted by Π = (V, E). Each rotation corresponds to a vertex in V and there exists an edge from ρ to ρ if ρ precedes ρ. The number of rotations in Π is bounded by n(n−1)/2 and the number of arcs is bounded by n 2 . It should also be noted that the construction of Π can be done in O(n 2 ) [14] . There are two different edge types in a rotation poset: type 1 and type 2 . Suppose m i , w j is in rotation ρ, if ρ is the unique rotation that moves m i to w j then (ρ , ρ) ∈ E and ρ is called a type 1 predecessor of ρ. If ρ moves m i below w j , and ρ = ρ is the unique rotation that moves w j above m i , then (ρ , ρ) ∈ E and ρ is called a type 2 predecessor of ρ [14] .
A closed subset S is a set of rotations such that for any rotation ρ in S, if there exists a rotation ρ that precedes ρ then ρ is also in S. Every closed subset in the rotation poset corresponds to a stable matching [14] . A node that has no outgoing edges is called a leaf node and a node that has no incoming edges is called root node. Let L(S) be the set of rotations that are the leaf nodes of S. Similarly, let N(S) be the set of the rotations that are not in S, but all of their predecessors are in S. This can be illustrated as having a cut in the graph Π, where the cut divides Π into two sub-graphs, namely Π 1 and Π 2 . If there are any comparable nodes between Π 1 and Π 2 , Π 1 is the part that contains the preceding rotations. Eventually, Π 1 corresponds to the closed subset S, L(S) corresponds to the leaf nodes of Π 1 and N(S) corresponds to the root nodes of Π 2 . Corollary 1. Each set of incomparable rotations in V corresponds to a stable matching of I.
Proof. In a closed subset S, it is always true that for every rotation ρ in S, all the predecessors of ρ are in S. Therefore, each set of incomparable nodes can be used to define a stable matching M, where the closed subset of M is obtained by adding all predecessors of each rotation to the set.
Predecessors of a rotation ρ in a rotation poset are denoted by N − (ρ) and successors are denoted by N + (ρ). We measure the distance between two stable matchings M i , M j by the number of men that have different partners in M i and M j , denoted by d(M i , M j ). We also denote by X(R) the set of men involved in a set of rotations R.
Let us illustrate these terms on a sample SM instance specified by the preference lists of 7 men/women in Table 1 given by Genc et. al [8] . For the sake of clarity, each man m i is denoted with i and each woman w j with j. Figure 2 represents the rotation poset and all the rotations associated with this sample. The man-optimal matching for the given sample is M 0 = {(0, 5), (1, 4) , (2, 6), m0 0 6 5 2 4 1 3 w0 2 1 6 4 5 3 0 m1 6 1 4 5 0 2 3 w1 0 4 3 5 2 6 1 m2 6 0 3 1 5 4 2 w2 2 5 0 4 3 1 6 m3 3 2 0 1 4 6 5 w3 6 1 2 3 4 0 5 m4 1 2 0 3 4 5 6 w4 4 6 0 5 3 1 2 m5 6 1 0 3 5 4 2 w5 3 1 2 6 5 4 0 m6 2 5 0 6 4 3 1 w6 4 6 2 1 3 0 5 Table 1 . Preference lists for men (left) and women (right) for a sample instance of size 7. Table 2 . Rotation poset of the instance given in Table 1 . (1, 5) , (2, 6) , (3, 3) , (4, 1), (5, 4) , (6, 0)}. For M 2 , leaf and neighbor nodes can be identified as L(S 2 ) = {ρ 1 } and N(S 2 ) = {ρ 2 , ρ 4 }.
Schaefer's Dichotomy Theorem for Satisfiability
The original Schaefer's dichotomy theorem is proposed in [15] . In this section, we use the same terminology and notations as in [16] . A literal is a Boolean variable or its negation. A clause is a disjunction of literals. If x is a Boolean variable, then the literal x is called positive and the literal ¬x is called negative. We shall use the term formula to say a Boolean formula given in a conjunctive normal form (CNF) as a finite set of clauses.
A formula is called Horn (respectively dual-Horn) if every clause in this formula contains a positive (respectively negative) literal. A linear equation over the 2-element field is an expression of the form x 1 ⊕ x 2 . . . ⊕ x k = δ where ⊕ is the sum modulo 2 operator and δ is 0 or 1. An affine formula is a conjunction of linear equations over the 2-element field.
An assignment is a mapping from (Boolean) variables to {true, f alse}. An assignment A is said to satisfy a clause C if and only if there exists a variable x such that C contains x and the assignment of x by A is true or C contains ¬x and the assignment of Let Φ be a set of constraint applications, and A be an assignment to all variables occurring in Φ. A is said to be a satisfying assignment of Φ if A satisfies every constraint application in A.
Let C be a set of Boolean constraints. SAT (C) is defined as the following decision problem: Given a finite set Φ of constraints applications from C, is there a satisfying assignment for Φ? Theorem 1. Dichotomy Theorem for Satisfiability [16, 15] . Let C be a set of Boolean constraints. If C satisfies at least one of the conditions (a)-(f ) below,
a) Every constraint in C evaluates to true if all assignments are true. b) Every constraint in C evaluates to true if all assignments are f alse. c) Every constraint in C can be expressed as a Horn formula. d) Every constraint in C can be expressed as a dual-Horn formula. e) Every constraint in C can be expressed as affine formula. f ) Every constraint in C can be expressed as a 2-CNF formula.
A specific problem family
In this section, we describe a restricted, specific family F of Stable Marriage instances over properties on its generic rotation poset Π F = (V F , E F ).
Prop. 1 Each rotation ρ i ∈ V F , contains exactly 2 pairs ρ i = ( m i1 , w i1 , m i2 , w i2 ). Prop. 2 Each rotation ρ i ∈ V F , has at most 2 predecessors and 2 successors. Prop. 3 Each edge e i ∈ E F , is a type 1 edge. Prop. 4 For each i ∈ [1, n], m i is involved in at least 2 rotations. Lemma 1. For any two different paths P 1 and P 2 defined on Π F , where both start at rotation ρ s , end at ρ t , and the pair m e , w f ∈ ρ s , if all rotations on P 1 (respectively P 2 ) contain m e , at least one of the rotations on P 2 (respectively P 1 ) does not contain w f .
Proof. The proof is immediate from the fact that a pair that was exposed and therefore eliminated by a rotation on a stable matching can not be reproduced.
be any rotation that has exactly 2 predecessors namely ρ pi1 , ρ pi2 and 2 successors ρ si1 , ρ si2 . The man m i1 is involved exactly in one of the predecessors and one of the successors by Prop. 3. If we denote those rotations by ρ pi1 , ρ si1 , using the same reasoning, m i2 is involved in the other predecessor and the other successor ρ pi2 , ρ si2 . The rest of the men involved in ρ pi1 , ρ pi2 , ρ si1 , ρ si2 are different from each other. Same is also applied for the women. Figure 2 illustrates this property. Note that, the ordering of the pairs is not important as there exist only two pairs in each rotation.
Definition 2 (π F 1 ) A particular case of π 1 , with the restrictions from problem family F. Fig. 2 . An illustration of the men/women included in rotations for cases where a rotation has exactly 1 predecessor and 1 successor (A,B), 1 predecessor and 2 successors, which is also similar to 1 successor and 2 predecessors (C), 2 predecessors and 2 successors (D).
Complexity results
In order to prove that the general problem π 1 is N P-complete, we have to show that the restricted family problem π F 1 is N P-complete. And in order to do this, we will first prove it for a particular case noted π F 2 .
N P-completeness
Definition 3 (π 2 ) The special case of π 1 , where a = 1, b = 1.
Using the definition of π 2 , we define a sub-problem of it using the restrictions from Fas following. Before showing that π F 2 is N P-complete, we need to define a particular SAT problem which is N P-complete.
Definition 5 Let SAT-SM be the specific SAT SuperMatch problem that we will define in this section. The problem is defined by a set χ of indexes, n lists containing the | χ | indexes in an orderly manner, and a specific SAT formula built from these lists. The decision problem consists in deciding if there exists a valid assignment of each literal that satisfies the CNF formula.
For each list l ∈ [1, n], we have one list of ordered indexes defined by ( χ l 1 , . . . , χ l k l ), where k l is the number of indexes in the list l and k l ≥ 2. We also fix the fact that each index appears in exactly two lists:
For illustration, the ordered list represents the index of each rotation having the man m l . The order specifies the path in the rotation poset from the first rotation to the last one for a man m l . And the restriction for having each index in two different lists comes from Prop. 1.
Additionally we have the following rule over the lists:
where l a ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j > i, there cannot exist a sequence between these two indexes, constructed by iterating the two consecutive rules a and b for each two consecutive elements (i.e. [b-a-b-. . . -a(b)]). For each list l m ∈ [1, n], i < k lm , each element of the sequence of form χ lm i is followed by:
Now we can define the SAT formulation. First, we start with defining the variables: Let | χ | ∈ N * , Y = {y e | e ∈ {1, ..., | χ |}}, S = {s e | e ∈ {1, ..., | χ |}}, and P = {p e | e ∈ {1, ..., | χ |}} three sets of distinct boolean variables. A CNF formula is defined by conjunction of four groups of clauses: A , B , C and D . The groups are subject to the following conditions:
A : For any list ( χ l 1 , . . . , χ l k l ), we have a disjunction between the Y -elements and the P -elements having these indexes.
(1) B : For any list ( χ l 1 , . . . , χ l k l ), we have a disjunction between two S-elements with consecutive indexes defined by
(2)
C : This group of clauses will be split in two. For any list ( χ l 1 , . . . , χ l k l ), the first sub-group C 1 contains all the clauses defined by the logic formula
. With a CNF notation, it leads to
) .
(3)
The second sub-group C 2 has three specific cases according to the position of indexes in the ordered lists. As fixed above, any index value appears in exactly two different lists. Thus, for any index value e, there exists two lists l 1 and l 2 such that χ l1 i = χ l2 j = e, where i ∈ [1, k l1 ] and j ∈ [1, k l2 ]. For each couple of indexes ( χ l1 i , χ l2 j ) equal to the same value, we define a clause with these indexes and the next ones in their respective ordered lists:
With a CNF notation it leads to:
).
We add the two cases where χ l1 i or χ l2 j , or both are the last index of their respective lists. The complete formula for the set of clauses C 2 is:
Similarly, for each couple of indexes ( χ l1 i , χ l2 j ) equal to the same value e, we define a clause with these indexes and the previous ones in their respective ordered lists:
. With a CNF notation, it leads to:
By generalizing the formula for any couple, and by adding the two cases where χ l1 i , or χ l2 j , or both are the first indexes of their respective lists, the complete formula D is described by:
To conclude the definition, the full CNF formula of SAT-SM is
Lemma 2. There always exist some clauses of minimum length 4 that are defined over positive literals in A .
Proof. For any list of ordered indexes l, the length of each list is defined as k l ≥ 2 in SAT-SM, which results in A having n clauses that have at least 4 positive literals in each.
Lemma 3. There always exist some clauses of length 2 that are defined over two negative literals in C .
Proof. The clauses in C consists of two groups. The first group is defined over the list of ordered indexes. For any two consecutive variables in the list, there exists two clauses:
). By definition, the minimum length of an ordered list l is k l = 2 and therefore the minimum-length list yields in 2 clauses of the defined form. Therefore, the first group includes 2 × l∈{1,...,n} (k l − 1) clauses. Proof. Any clause C of the given form with k positive literals have 2 k − 1 valid assignments. The cardinality of an affine relation is always a power of 2 [15] . Thus, C is not affine.
Proof. We use Schaefer's dichotomy theorem (Theorem 1) to prove that SAT-SM is N P-complete [15] . Schaefer identifies six cases, where if any one of them is valid the SAT problem is solved in polynomial time. Any SAT formula that does not satisfy any of those 6 is N P-complete.
It is easy to see the properties a, d, and f in Schaefer's Dichotomy do not apply to SAT-SM due to Lemma 2. Similarly, properties b and c are not satisfiable because of Lemma 3. The clauses in A are defined as clauses over positive literals and it is known that they always exist by Lemma 2. By applying Lemma 4 on the clauses in A , we infer that property e is not applicable either. Hence, SAT-SM is N P-complete.
We can now present the main result of the paper.
Proof. Verification of robustness of a given stable matching was previously shown to be polynomial-time decidable [8] . Therefore, it is immediate that the decision problem π F 2 is in N P. We will show that π F 2 is N P-complete by presenting a polynomial reduction from the SAT-SM problem to π F 2 as follows. From an instance I SSM of SAT-SM, we will construct in polynomial time an instance I of π F 2 . This means the construction of the rotation poset Π F = (V F , E F ) with all stable pairs in the rotations, and the preference lists.
We first start constructing the set of rotations V F and then proceed by deciding which man is a part of which stable pair in which rotation. First, ∀e ∈ [1, | χ |], we have a corresponding rotation ρ e . Second, ∀l ∈ [1, n], ∀ χ l i ∈ [1, k l ], we insert m l as the man to the first empty pair in rotation ρ χ l i . Each man of π F 2 is involved in at least two rotations (satisfying Prop. 4).
As each χ l i appears in exactly two different clauses, each rotation is guaranteed to contain exactly two pairs involving different men (Prop. 1), and to possess at most two predecessors and two successors in Π F (Prop. 2) .
For the construction of the set of arcs E F , for each couple of indexes ( χ l i , χ l i+1 ), ∀i ∈ [1, k l − 1], we add an arc from ρ χ l i to ρ χ l i+1 . Note that this construction, yields in each arc in E representing a type 1 relationship (Prop. 3).Because each arc links two rotations, where exactly one of the men is involved in both rotations. Now, in order to complete the rotation poset Π F , the women involved in rotations must also be added. The following procedure is used to complete the rotation poset:
1. For each index χ l 1 with l ∈ [1, n], let ρ χ l 1 be the rotation that involves man m l . In this case, the partner of m l in ρ χ l 1 is completed by inserting woman w l , so that the resulting rotation will contain the stable pair m l , w l ∈ ρ χ l 1 . 2. We perform a breadth-first search on the rotation poset from the completed rotations. For each complete rotation ρ = ( m i , w b , m k , w d ) ∈ V F , let ρ s1 (resp. ρ s2 ) be one of the successor of ρ and modifying m i (resp. m k ). If ρ s1 exists, then we insert the woman w d in ρ s1 as the partner of man m i . In the same manner, if ρ s2 exists, we insert the woman w b in ρ s2 as the partner of man m k . The procedure creates at most two stable pairs. From the fact that each woman goes to the next rotation having the second man, in the SAT-SM definition it is equivalent to go from an index χ l1 i to χ l2 j+1 where χ l1 i = χ l2 j . Thus the path where the woman appears follow a sequence defined as the one in [Rule 1] from the SAT-SM definition. By this rule, we can conclude that Lemma 1 is satisfied.
All along the construction, we showed that all the properties required, to have a valid rotation poset from the family F, are satisfied. Using this process we are adding equal number of women and men in the rotation poset.
The last step to obtain an instance I of π F 2 is the construction of the preference lists. By using the rotation poset created above, we can construct incomplete preference lists for the men and women. We use a similar approach to a procedure previously defined by Gusfield et. al. for creating the lists [17] :
-Apply topological sort on V F . -For each man m i ∈ [1, n], insert woman w i as the most preferred to m i 's preference list. -For each woman w i ∈ [1, n], insert man m i as the least preferred to w i 's preference list. -For each rotation ρ ∈ V F in the ordered set, for each pair m i , w j produced by ρ, insert w j to the man m i 's list in decreasing order of preference ranking. Similarly, place m i to w j 's list in increasing order of preference ranking.
The Lemma 1 imposed on our rotation poset clearly involves that each preference list contains each member of the opposite sex at most once. To finish, one can observe that the instance obtained respects the Stable Marriage requirements and the specific properties from problem family F.
⇐ Suppose that there exists a solution to an instance I of the decision problem π F 2 . Then we have a (1, 1)-supermatch and its corresponding closed subset S. As defined in Section 2, L(S) is the set of leaf nodes of S, N(S) the set of nodes such that all their predecessors are in S but not themselves. From these two sets, we can assign all the literals in I SSM as follows: If S represents a (1, 1)-supermatch, that means by removing only one rotation present in L(S) or by only adding one rotation from N(S), any pair of the corresponding stable matching can be repaired with no additional modifications. Thus any men must be contained in a leaf or a neighbor node. This leads to having for each man one of the literals assigned to true in his list in SAT-SM. Therefore every clause in A are satisfied.
For the clauses in B , for any man's list the clauses are forcing each s i literal to be true if the next one s i+1 is. By definition of a closed subset, from any leaf of S, all the preceding rotations (indexes in the lists) must be in S. And thus every clause in B is satisfied.
As the clauses in C altogether capture the definition of being a leaf node of S, they will all be satisfied by L(S). At last, for the clauses in D , it is also easy to see that any rotation being in N(S) is equivalent to not being in the solution and having predecessors in. Thus all the clauses will be satisfied.
Thus we can conclude that this assignment satisfy the SAT formula of I SSM .
⇒ Suppose that there exists a solution to an instance I SSM of the decision problem SAT-SM. Thus we have a valid assignment to satisfy the SAT formula of I SSM . We will construct a closed subset S to solve I. As previously, we use the sets L(S) and N (S), then for each literal y i assigned to true, we put the rotation ρ i in L(S). We are doing the same for p i and s i as above.
The clauses in B enforce the belonging to S of all rotations preceding any element of S, thus the elements in S form a closed subset. To obtain a (1, 1)supermatch, we have to be sure we can repair any couple by removing only one rotation present in L(S) or by only adding one rotation from N(S). The clauses in C enforce the rotations in L(S) to be without successors in S. And in the same way the clauses in D enforce the rotations in N (S) to not be in S but have their predecessors in the solution. Now we just have to check that all the men are contained in at least one rotation from L(S) ∪ N(S). By the clauses from A , we know that at least one y e or p e for any man m i is assigned to true. Thus from this closed subset S, we can repair any couple m i , w j in one modification by removing/adding the rotation having m i . Since there exists a 1 − 1 equivalence between a stable matching and the closed subset in the rotation poset, we have a (1, 1)-supermatch.
Corollary 1 From the Theorem 3 and by generality, the decision problems π 1 and π 2 are N P-completes.
Concluding Remarks
We study the complexity of the Robust Stable Marriage (RSM) problem. In order to show that given a stable marriage instance, deciding if there exists an (a, b)-supermatch is N P-complete, we first introduce a SAT formulation which models a specific family of stable marriage instances. We show that the formulation is N P-complete by Schaefer's Dichotomy Theorem. Then we apply a reduction from this problem to prove the N P-completeness of RSM. Then we show equivalence between the Robust Stable Marriage problem and the SAT formulation.
